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Abstract 
Vote decision-making processes in List-PR systems are often described as uncertain or complex. Since 
voters do not have full information about all candidates, they rely on informational cues as cognitive 
shortcuts to make a well-informed vote choice. It has been found that both gender and list position 
influence voters’ perceptions of a candidate’s competence, but the interaction of both remains 
underexposed. By including list position in the analysis, this paper explores a new and central element 
of PR electoral systems.  
We conducted an experimental study among a representative sample of the Flemish (Belgian) 
population. Flanders, which combines a flexible list-PR system with far-reaching quota regulations, 
provides a good case study for exploring the interaction between gender and list position cues. Our 
results demonstrate that gendered perceptions of competence are not mediated by list position. Female 
candidates do not enjoy additional advantages from a head of list position, nor do women with a middle 
of list position suffer from lower perceived competence.  
The present study illustrates that Flemish voters are not inherently negatively biased towards female 
candidates, at least when it comes to perceptions of competence. Flemish voters have been intensively 
exposed to female politicians in parliament and government. As such, this might explain their less biased 
evaluation, which applies to all female candidates. We therefore argue that the positive effects of a 
gender-neutral political context on voters’ evaluation of women candidates are rather beneficial for all 
female candidates and not limited to high-level female candidates.  
Keywords: heuristic cues, gender, list position, political representation, political psychology, survey 
experiments 
1. Introduction 
Voters often have very limited information about individual candidates (Carpini & Keeter, 1997), 
especially in List-PR systems, in which large numbers of candidates are presented on different party 
lists. It is therefore difficult to make well-informed vote choices. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1975) 
bounded rationality theory states that, in such cases, people rely on a limited number of heuristic 
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principles to reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and making decisions. Even in low-
information contexts, voters obtain some basic information about the candidates (McDermott, 1997), 
which is then used as heuristic cue, i.e. a cognitive shortcut to estimate the features of political candidates 
(Conover & Feldman, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975).  
The ballot list is the most basic piece of information and is available to all voters. This is an important 
source of information and contains two crucial cues. First, a candidate’s gender can usually be 
determined by the candidate’s first name. It is commonly thought that citizens hold gendered attitudes 
about who fits the image of a good politician (Taylor-Robinson, Yarkoney-Sorek, & Geva, 2016). 
Research demonstrates that women are stereotyped as being less adept for leadership roles (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), as less competent for politics in general 
(Dolan, 2014; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a; Lawless, 2004) and as more competent in communal issues 
(e.g. child care, education and health care) (Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Kahn, 1996; Matland, 1994). 
This is, however, conditional upon the political context, which can alter the influence of gender 
stereotypes on candidate evaluations (Holman, Merolla, & Zechmeister, 2016). 
Second, also the list position of a candidate is a highly visible information cue, which can easily be 
observed by glancing through the ballot lists. Research has demonstrated that candidates gain a greater 
share of the vote when they are listed first on the ballot (Blom-Hansen, Elklit, Serritzlew, & Villadsen, 
2016; Lutz, 2010; Maddens, Wauters, Noppe, & Fiers, 2006; Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). Different 
underlying mechanisms, such as selection and campaign effects, can be distinguished. Also competence 
effects explain part of the puzzle (Devroe & Wauters, 2017a): candidates on top of the ballot are 
perceived as more competent than candidates lower down the list. Consequently, a high list position can 
be seen as a heuristic for the competence of the candidates occupying these top positions. 
Both gender and list position cues have an impact on voters’ perceptions of the competence of political 
candidates. In this paper, we will focus on the interaction of those two heuristic cues. The theory of 
interactions (Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997) states that both cues could interact to help voters to 
form coherent impressions (Kundra & Sinclair, 1999). For example, female candidate could benefit from 
a head of list position, because the information attached to a high list position (i.e. candidates listed first 
are highly competent) is deviant from the general impression of female candidates. Moreover, despite 
stringent quota regulations, the number of female head of list candidates is below that of male head of 
list candidates. Therefore, voters might have the impression that those female candidates who succeed 
in obtaining a top list position have to be extremely qualified. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
female candidates with a middle of list position will be worse off. Quota regulations are often criticized 
for leading to the selection of unqualified candidates just to meet the quota standards (see for example 
Júlio & Tavares, 2017; Wauters, Maddens, & Put, 2014; Weeks & Baldez, 2015), which possibly results 
in lower levels of perceived competence for female middle of list candidates.  
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Flanders, the largest region of Belgium, provides a good case study for exploring the interaction between 
gender and list position cues. It has a flexible List-PR system, leaving voters the choice between casting 
a preferential vote or a list vote, and far-reaching quota regulations, requiring that one of the two top 
places on the list should be reserved for a woman (Celis & Meier, 2006). An analysis of how the list 
position of a candidate interacts with gendered perceptions about his/her competence, provides us with 
the opportunity to expand our knowledge on the use of informational cues in voting contexts. By 
including position in the analysis, a new and crucial element of PR electoral systems will be explored.  
Interaction of voter cues that have been studied before (see infra) in proportional representation systems 
are candidate gender and party affiliation (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007) and candidate gender and physical 
appearance (Lammers, Gordijn, & Otten, 2009). Both studies found significant interaction effects 
between gender and other informational cues. In some cases this interaction brought about a negative 
effect for female candidates (i.e. opponents of political parties dislike female candidates more than male 
candidates), but in other cases a positive effect was found (i.e. female candidates are preferred when the 
most important problem of the day is related to communal issues).  
The central question is whether the list position of a candidate mediates gendered perceptions of 
competence. We hypothesized that the perceived level of competence of female head of list candidates 
will be higher compared to male head of list candidates. Rather surprisingly, our results, based on 
experimental research conducted among a representative sample of the Flemish population, point to a 
different pattern. The interaction of gender and list position cues does not bring about statistically 
significant effects on voters’ perceptions of competence.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we elaborate on gender cues and how they influence 
voters’ perceptions of competence. The concept of list position cues and the underlying competence 
effect mechanism is introduced in the third section. In the fourth section, we focus on the interaction 
between both cues. We also develop our central research question and hypothesis. Our methodological 
approach will be charted in the fifth section. This will be followed by a presentation and a thorough 
discussion of the research results. In the concluding section, it will be argued that a gender-neutral 
political context has positive effects for all female candidates, irrespective of their list position.  
2. Gender cues 
The gender of a candidate, unlike other demographic cues such as age or level of education, can usually 
be determined by a candidate’s first name. Voters associate the gender of a political candidate with 
particular personality traits, capacities and opinions (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993b), which are referred 
to as political gender stereotypes (Dolan, 2014; Fox & Smith, 1998). In their seminal work, Huddy and 
Terkildsen (1993b) developed two varieties of political gender stereotypes, those based on women’s 
traits and those based on their beliefs. The former, which is labelled the trait approach, is especially 
relevant for our purposes. This approach states that voters’ assumptions about a candidate’s gender-
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linked personality traits drive expectations that women and men have different areas of competence. 
Since women are seen as communal and social, they are expected to be better at communal issues related 
to the traditional domain of the family. Indeed, experimental studies have found that women’s 
competence is restricted to communal areas, such as education and health care, whereas male candidates 
excel in all other issue domains (Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Kahn, 1996; Matland, 1994).  
The bulk of research on political gender stereotypes demonstrates that voters consider masculine 
characteristics as more important than feminine traits in politics, regardless of the level of office at stake 
(Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993b; Lawless, 2004; Rosenwasser & Dean, 1989). In other words, people 
believe that male candidates are stronger candidates and more knowledgeable than their female 
counterparts (Kahn, 1996). On the other hand, female politicians score significantly lower than male 
politicians on leadership and competence (Sapiro, 1981; Koch, 1999; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Dolan, 
2014), two characteristics central to being a successful politician (Schneider & Bos, 2014).  
It is, however, important to note that the effect of candidate gender is mediated by the broader political 
context. Results from Costa Rica and Israel highlight that the important issues of the day and the history 
of women in government affects whether voters positively evaluate female candidates. Women are more 
positively evaluated in Costa Rica, which can be described as a ‘best case scenario’ for displaying gender 
neutral attitudes due to its extensive experience with women in government, compared to Israel, which 
has limited experience with women holding seats in the Knesset or cabinet (Taylor-Robinson et al., 
2016).  
Results from Flanders, which has one of the highest shares of elected women in the world, confirm the 
patterns detected in Taylor et al.’s (2016) study and emphasize again the importance of the political 
context. Here, the differences in perceived issue competence are rather small and not always 
unequivocal. Gender-linked traits and competences only have an impact in some policy domains, for 
example defense. For other policy domains, the personal qualities needed to master them do not seem 
to simply correspond to typical male or female traits (Devroe & Wauters, 2017b). Flemish voters have 
been extensively exposed to female politicians, taking up prominent roles. As a consequence, Flemish 
voters might be less likely to hold gendered attitudes.  
3. List position cues 
In List-PR systems parties present their candidates in ordered lists. Being on top of the list is not based 
on random rotation of names, as in majoritarian systems, but the result of well-thought out selection 
processes by political parties. A positive effect of being listed first on the ballot on vote shares has been 
empirically demonstrated (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Faas & Schoen, 2006; Geys & Heyndels, 2003; 
Lutz, 2010; Marcinkiewicz, 2014; Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). This is labeled the Ballot Position 
Effect.  
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Different underlying mechanisms for this Ballot Position Effect can be distinguished: selection effects 
(parties select electorally attractive candidates for the top list positions), campaign effects (top 
candidates receive more attention in the election campaign) and easy vote mechanisms, ranging from 
purely irrational voting strategies to competence effects, in which the list position can be seen as a 
heuristic cue for the competence of candidates (Devroe & Wauters, 2017a; Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). 
Competence effects refer to the idea that if a candidate gets a high position from his/her party, this 
candidate must be qualified and competent. Voters want to reduce the costs of acquiring and analyzing 
information about a large number of candidates. Therefore, they rely on the evaluation of the candidates 
by the party. The reasoning here is that parties have already made a selection based on the capability of 
(potential) candidates, which voters are likely to trust. Consequently, the list position can be considered 
as an extra voting cue by which political parties send signals to voters about the quality of the presented 
candidates (Devroe & Wauters, 2017a).  
Experimental research affirms that the list position has an impact on voters’ perceptions of the listed 
candidates’ competence in Flanders (Devroe & Wauters, 2017a). The general effect (i.e. higher levels 
of perceived competence for top list candidates) is due to a mixture of advantages for the head of list 
and disadvantages for candidates in the middle of the list. The latter refers to the fact that a middle of 
list position has a negative impact on the perception of competence, indicating that voters are less 
convinced about the general competence of middle of list candidates.  
4. Interaction of cues 
The previous sections highlight that both gender and list position cues have an impact on voters’ 
perceptions of candidates’ level of competence, which is a central criterion in vote decision-making 
processes in PR systems (Goeminne & Swyngedouw, 2007). According to the theory of interactions 
(Peffley et al., 1997), different information cues possibly interact with each other, eventually leading to 
reinforcing or weakening effects. This is related to the dual process framework, which states that various 
informational cues work in tandem to help people form coherent impressions (Kundra & Sinclair, 1999).  
Previous research in proportional representation systems focused on the interaction between gender and 
party affiliation (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007) and gender and physical appearance (Lammers et al., 2009). 
First, Aalberg and Jenssen (2007), in a Norwegian context, found a significant interaction effect between 
candidate’s gender and party affiliation. They demonstrated that opponents of a party like the candidate 
better when the candidate is male than when the candidate is female. This indicates that supporters of a 
party are more positive towards female candidates. Consequently, being female does not hurt within a 
party, it is among the opponents of the party the cost lies. Second, Lammers et al. (2009) ’s study on the 
Netherlands illustrated that the interaction of a candidate’s gender, the most important problem and the 
physical appearance of the candidate influences election outcomes. If voters use gender cues to judge 
politicians, then the effects of these cues on bias toward men and women should be reversed for counter-
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prototypical (in terms of physical outlook) candidates. Indeed, prototypical male (female) candidates 
were considered as better candidates when the most important problem issue is a competitive 
(communal) one. On the other hand, counter-prototypical male (female) candidates were considered as 
better candidates when the most important problem is a communal (competitive) one. In sum, both 
studies provide evidence for the idea that different informational cues work in tandem. In some cases 
this interaction brings about a reinforcing effect (i.e. opponents of political parties dislike female 
candidates more than male candidates), but in other cases a weakening effect is found (i.e. female 
candidates are preferred when the most important problem of the day is related to communal issues).  
We believe that also list position cues might interact with gender cues and gendered expectations about 
the competences of male and female candidates. Although list position is an important feature of list-
PR systems, its mediating effect on gendered perceptions of competence has remained untouched so far. 
Research shows that Flemish voters do not hold gendered perceptions on competence of female 
candidates (Devroe & Wauters, 2017b). This seems to indicate that Flemish voters are not inherently 
negatively biased towards female candidates. However, we do not know whether this applies to all 
female candidates, or for example only to high-level female politicians, such as head of list candidates. 
This can be linked to the debate on quota policies, in which it is often argued that the requirement to 
nominate more women candidates will lead to the election of women that are not up to the job (Wauters 
et al., 2014). This especially applies to female candidates with a lower list position of whom it is thought 
that they are only selected through an obligation to fulfill a quota, rather than for their qualities (Murray, 
2010). The public debates surrounding quota adoption may shape expectations about who and how these 
female candidates are. By extension, the content of such discussions is likely to influence how the 
performance of female candidates is evaluated by the public in general (Franceschet, Krook, & Piscopo, 
2009).  
Our central research question is whether the list position of a candidate mediates gendered perceptions 
of competence.  
RQ: Is the effect of a candidate’s gender on his/her perceived level of competence mediated by list 
position? 
Previous research demonstrates that voters believe that head of list candidates are better candidates in 
terms of perceived competence. When it comes to list composition, women have become better 
represented at the top of the lists from 2003 onwards in Flanders. This can be linked to the introduction 
of more stringent quota regulations in 2002. However, research demonstrates that the political parties 
only complied in a minimalistic way with the quota regulations concerning the top positions (Smulders, 
Put, & Maddens, 2014; Wauters et al., 2014) and that men are still overrepresented. As a consequence, 
voters might have the impression that those female candidates who actually make it to the top list 
positions have to be extremely qualified and have outstanding competences. In that case, voters are less 
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likely to apply a gender stereotyped view on women’s competence, because other information, linked 
to a high list position, runs counter to their initial stereotype (Kundra & Sinclair, 1999). Furthermore, 
there is a basic assumption that strong competition leads to selection of the very best. Quota systems 
inherently involve and enhance competition between women, for example in the nomination process 
(Dahlerup, 2006). Therefore, we expect that female candidates will benefit more from a head of list 
position. This is summarized in the following hypothesis:  
H1: The perceived general competence of female head of list candidates will be higher than that 
of male head of list candidates. 
On the other hand, and also linked to the debate on quota policies, female candidates with a middle of 
list position could be worse off. We already know that a middle of list position has a negative impact on 
perceptions of competence. On top of that, methods of affirmative action such as electoral gender quotas, 
are controversial in many contexts and are often framed as unfair or as promoting unqualified individuals 
(in this case women) over more qualified ones (men) (Franceschet et al., 2009; Wauters et al., 2014; 
Weeks & Baldez, 2015). This gives the impression that these female candidates have been selected on 
the grounds of their gender, rather than their suitability for the job. Consequently, middle of list women 
have the possibility of being taken for quota women, as candidates who are only selected in order to 
meet the quota standards and to complete ballot lists (Murray, 2010). This reduces their esteem in the 
eyes of voters (Krook, 2008) and could have a negative effect on their perceived competence, which is 
summarized in the following hypothesis:  
H2: The perceived general competences of women with a middle of list position will be lower than 
that of men with a middle of list position.  
Before turning to the empirical analyses, we will discuss our methodological design in the next section.  
5. Methodological design 
We set up a quasi-experimental research design in which hypothetical candidates were presented to 
respondents in text messages in which only their sex, their position on the list and their policy position 
on a particular issue were mentioned. The party identification of the presented candidates was not 
indicated in order not to influence respondents’ assessments of the presented candidates.  
We focussed on Flanders. This is an interesting case for several reasons. It has a proportional electoral 
system with a flexible ballot list. Flexible formats give both party leaders and voters some say in the 
allocation of seats among its candidates (Schmidt, 2009): the order of the ballot list is determined by 
parties, but voters can change the order of candidates by casting preferential votes (Deschouwer, 2012). 
Voters can choose between two types of votes: a list vote (i.e. a vote for a political party) or a preferential 
vote (i.e. a vote for one or more candidates belonging to the same party). Candidates who receive enough 
preferential votes to pass the electoral threshold get elected automatically. Other candidates can 
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complement their pool of votes by making use of the list votes. These votes are distributed to candidates 
according to their order on the list, offering a substantial advantage to candidates at the top of the list 
(Wauters, Weekers, & Maddens, 2010).2 
Moreover, Flanders has far-reaching quota regulations. The first quota law, introduced in 1994, stated 
that maximum two thirds of the candidates of a list could be of the same sex. The revised quota law, 
introduced in 2002, required an equal number of men and women on the list and that at least one of the 
three top places on the list should be reserved for a woman (Celis & Meier, 2006). In 2010, it became 
compulsory to have at least one women in the top two. Quota legislation has led to a substantial increase 
of women MPs and women have become much better represented at the top of the lists from 2003 
onwards (Smulders et al., 2014; Wauters et al., 2014), although there still is a discrepancy with male 
candidates. This setting of a flexible List-PR system and far-reaching quota regulations makes Flanders 
a good case for exploring the interaction between gender and list position cues.  
Our study used a 2x3x6 mixed complete block design. The candidate’s gender (male versus female) and 
the list position (head of list, position in the middle or no list position mentioned) were manipulated as 
between-group factors. The hypothetical candidates presented their views on six different policy issues. 
We selected two policy issues that are generally linked to women’s competences (health care and 
education), two policy issues that are generally linked to men’s domains (defence and finance) and two 
gender-neutral issues (tourism and climate). These issue domains were manipulated as within-groups 
factor.  
The experiment was conducted in March-April 2017. An invitation to participate was sent to 21 526 
respondents. 11 837 of them actually received and read3 the invitation and 4052 agreed to participate. 
After discarding respondents who could not correctly answer the first manipulation check (a question 
about the gender of the presented candidate), we retained 2500 participants. The external validity of our 
experiment is enhanced by conducting the study among a sample of the population, whereas most other 
experimental studies analyse students. Although students are of voting age and vary in their level of 
involvement in politics, they are a more homogenous population than the general population (Chang & 
Hitchon, 2004). Moreover, it could be argued that students, the youngest voters, are more likely to have 
been exposed to women in (prominent) positions in government and parliament. They therefore might 
be more liberal in their attitudes towards female candidates (Kahn, 1996) and the chances are higher that 
they will have developed gender neutral attitudes. Furthermore, several measures were taken to increase 
the representativeness of our sample. Respondents were drawn from iVOX’s internet-based access 
                                                          
2 A new law, introduced at the beginning of the 21st century, halved the impact of list votes on the allocation of 
seats to candidates, thereby slightly diminishing the advantage of higher ranked candidates. It is therefore more 
common nowadays that lower positioned candidates get elected, especially in the context of local elections, 
because they receive a high amount of preferential votes (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). 
3 The other invitations were sent to invalid or outdated email addresses.  
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panel, which is the largest online panel in Flanders with about 150,000 potential respondents. Although 
it is difficult to determine how well these panel members represent the general population (De Leeuw 
& Hox, 2008; Manfreda & Vehovar, 2008), we tried to maximize their representativeness. We set 
several quotas: a hard quota for the gender of the respondents and soft quotas for their age and level of 
education. In addition, our sample was weighted for gender and age (weighting factors ranging from 
0.76 to 1.47).  
The respondents were randomly assigned to six different treatments. After each text message, they were 
asked to complete a questionnaire about the presented candidate and message, before continuing to the 
next profile. The order of the issue domains was randomized in order to control for order effects. There 
was also a random variation of male and female candidates, and of head of list and middle of list 
candidates. The hypothetical candidates were presented as ‘candidate X’. In Dutch, it is possible to 
indicate the different gender of these candidates (‘kandidaat’ for the male candidate and ‘kandidate’ for 
the female candidate). Likewise, gender-linked pronouns were used in the instructional paragraphs and 
questions. In all other respects, speeches and questionnaires were identical, in order not to provide any 
cues to the salience of gender. 
The presented candidate profiles included several elements: a text message, an image of the ballot 
(where we indicated the list position of the candidate) and a facial silhouette of the hypothetical 
candidate. The inclusion of facial silhouettes is innovative and is a subtle cue to respondents about the 
gender of the candidate. Previous studies mostly indicated the gender of the presented candidate by 
presenting him/her with a clear male/female name (e.g. Dolan, 2014; Falk & Kenski, 2006; Huddy & 
Terkildsen, 1993b; Matland, 1994; Rosenwasser, Rogers, Fling, Silvers-Pickens, & Butemeyer, 1987), 
or by including images (see for example Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007; Lammers et al., 2009). This could, 
however, bring in some noise in the experimental design. Lammers et al. (2009), for example, 
demonstrated that physical appearance also impacts on the perception of the presented person. Also 
names can evoke certain prejudices because they possibly remind respondents of someone with the same 
name or because they simply (dis)like the name.  
The provision of text messages is a standard practise in experimental studies on political gender 
stereotypes (see for example Dolan, 2014; Matland, 1994; Rosenwasser et al., 1987; Sapiro, 1981). 
These messages are based on a mix of the party programs of the 4 Flemish centre parties (CD&V, Open 
VLD, N-VA and sp.a), the Flemish government agreement and Flemish parties’ press statements. They 
were made as neutral as possible, with no obvious linkages to particular party positions or statements. 
An example of the presented profiles and a translation of the six different text messages can be found in 
the Appendix.  
Respondents were stimulated in various ways to intensively study the presented profiles. First, text 
messages were displayed 20 seconds by default, which obliged respondents to read these messages. 
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Second, manipulation checks were included to verify whether respondents were able to correctly answer 
questions about the candidate and the content of the message. All respondents had to answer a question 
about the sex of the presented candidate after the first treatment. Respondents who were not able to 
correctly answer this question could not further complete the questionnaire and their answers were not 
taken into account for the data analysis.4 The presented results therefore only stem from respondents 
who were aware of the gender of the presented candidate for their evaluations. We also included other 
manipulation checks, for example about the list position of the presented candidate (see infra), the 
content of the policy positions and the presented arguments, in order not to over-accentuate the 
importance of the candidate’s gender. This approach performed well, since only 27 respondents were 
able to correctly guess the intention of our study (see infra). Furthermore, respondents were incentivized 
to read the text messages thoroughly by highlighting that a prize (iPad Air 2 128 GB) would be raffled 
among those who could answer all the substantive questions correctly. An analysis of the answers to 
these questions indicates that a vast majority of respondents were able to correctly answer them. The 
lowest score of correct answers amounts to 84,95 per cent. We are therefore confident that the registered 
answers meet our quality standards. 
The most important advantage of an experimental approach is the possibility to control for a number of 
intervening factors. We took several measures to ensure that only our key variables (i.e. the gender of 
the candidate and his/her list position) played a role in the evaluation made by the respondents. First, 
the institutional context was held constant by focusing on Flanders. Second, the characteristics of 
respondents were controlled by randomly assigning them to one of the different treatments and by 
making comparisons between experimental groups. Third, by using hypothetical candidates without 
partisan affiliation, we did not intervene in actual discussion nor was there any effect of pre-existing 
preferences or personal (dis)tastes. Taken together, all these measures offer a methodologically more 
rigid test.  
From our initial sample, we additionally excluded three categories of respondents. First, respondents 
who completed the survey too fast (and consequently gave random answers) were excluded. These so-
called speeder respondents were defined as those who completed the survey in less than half of the 
average completion time5. Second, we also excluded respondents who could not correctly answer the 
question about the list position of the presented candidate. We only excluded those respondents who 
                                                          
4 The incorrect answers are more or less equally spread over the different issue domains, and over the different 
candidates (male-female, head of list-middle of list-control group). The percentage of incorrect answers ranges 
from 0.80% to 6.60% for all 36 presented profiles. Because of the risk of a selection effect (for example if only 
politically interested respondents were able to correctly answer this question), we made a comparison between the 
final sample and respondents who could not answer the manipulation check correctly. This analysis revealed that 
these groups did not differ substantially on important aspects. There was a small selection bias in that our final 
sample was slightly higher educated and younger, but there were no outspoken differences concerning gender and 
level of political interest. 
5 The average completion time was 996 seconds. The boundary duration from which a response is considered valid 
was set at 498 seconds.  
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misunderstood the list position of head of list candidates (111 respondents) and middle of list candidates 
(122 respondents). For the control group (i.e. candidates whose list position was not mentioned), we did 
not exclude any incorrect answers.6 Third, a question about the possible purpose of the study was 
included at the end of the survey to check whether respondents were able to find this out. Twenty-seven 
respondents provided an answer that was more or less in line with the purpose of our research. We 
decided to exclude the answers of those respondents because of a potential social desirability bias. 
However, since we also asked them to indicate at what point they found this out (while completing the 
questions for the first, second,…, sixth candidate), we did not have to exclude all of their answers. The 
exact number of registered answers varies therefore by policy issue. Our final sample consists of 2129 
respondents (which is a response rate of 17,99 %). A description of the basic characteristics of the 
respondents can be found in the Appendix (see Table 1). 
6. Results 
This section is divided into two parts. First, we focus on the aggregated level and perceived general 
competence. In the next part, we will include the different policy issues in the analysis and compare the 
perceived issue competence of female and male head of list and middle of list candidates (see 6.2).  
6.1. Aggregated analysis 
For this part of the analysis, we will not differentiate between the different policy issues included in the 
design, but focus on the aggregated level. Every respondent was presented six candidates, one for each 
policy issue. Consequently, the number of total observations amounts to 12, 774. The candidate variable, 
consisting of six categories, was recoded in a variable with only four categories: male head of list and 
middle of list candidate, and female head of list and middle of list candidate. The control group was left 
out. We calculated weighting factors for each group to exclude possible effects from respondent’s 
gender (gender solidarity effects). This means that there is an equal share of male and female respondents 
in each group.  
Each candidate profile was followed by a set of questions about the presented candidate. Respondents 
were asked to indicate how competent the presented candidate would be for politics in general. 
Responses were on a (fully-labelled) 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very 
competent). A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to examine whether there were 
significant differences in groups’ means. The means and standard deviations for each of the four groups 
are presented in Table 1. The Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was not significant [1.538, p > 
.05]. The one-way ANOVA of perceived general competence (see Table 2 in the Appendix) indicates 
that there are statistically significant differences in the perceived levels of general competence.  
                                                          
6 The provided answer categories for this question were not reliable to assess whether respondents were aware of 
the fact that the list position of these candidates was not mentioned.  
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Table 1: One-way ANOVA: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived General Competence 
Candidate  N Mean SD 
Male head of list 2078 4.71 1.266 
Female head of list 2122 4.72 1.212 
Male middle position 2033 4.61 1.197 
Female middle position 2062 4.59 1.211 
Total 8295 4.66 1.223 
 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey procedures were used to determine which pairs of the four group 
means differed. These results are given in Table 2. When it comes to the main effect of candidate gender, 
there are no statistically significant differences between the perceived level of competence of male and 
female candidates.7 This is in line with findings from Costa Rica (Taylor-Robinson et al., 2016) and 
previous research on issue competence stereotyping in Flanders (Devroe & Wauters, 2017b). These 
results indicate that respondents are not inherently negatively biased towards female candidates and 
estimate the general competence of male and female candidates more or less equally. As argued before, 
this might be related to the fact that there is a high number of female candidates and representatives in 
Flanders, which can be attributed to the existence of electoral gender quotas for about 25 years. Flemish 
voters have been extensively exposed to female candidates, resulting in a less biased evaluation and a 
more woman-friendly political context. 
Table 2: Tukey Post Hoc Results of Perceived General Competence by Presented Candidate 
  Mean Differences 
 Mean 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Male head of list (1) 4.71 0.000 -0.008 0.105* 0.128** 
Female head of list (2) 4.72 0.008 0.000 0.113* 0.136** 
Male middle position (3) 4.61 -0.105* -0.113* 0.000 0.023 
Female middle position 
(4) 
4.59 -0.128** -0.136** -0.023 0.000 
* p<.05, **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
We also see that a higher list position results in a better evaluation of general competence, both for male 
and female candidates. But more importantly, the mean score for female head of list candidates 
(M=4.72) does not differ significantly from male head of list candidates (M=4.71), although the bonus 
from a head of list position is somewhat more outspoken for female candidates (0.136 compared to 
                                                          
7 This effect also holds when we do not take list position into account (analysis not in table). 
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0.105). Nevertheless, we have to reject our first hypothesis (H1) stating that the perceived general 
competence of female head of list candidates will be higher than that of male head of list candidates.  
Rather surprisingly, our second hypothesis, stating that the perceived general competence of female 
candidates with a middle of list position will be lower than that of male candidates occupying a middle 
of list position, also has to be rejected. The mean score for female middle of list candidates (M=4.59) 
does not differ significantly from that of male middle of list candidates (M=4.61). 
In sum, on an aggregated level, list position does not seem to mediate the effect of a candidate’s gender 
on his/her perceived level of competence. The perceived general competence is more or less equal for 
both groups. In the next parts, we will include the policy issues in the analysis in order to see whether 
there is an interaction with the issue domain at hand.  
6.2. Issue competence analysis 
For this part of the analysis, we are interested in the perceived issue competence of female and male 
head of list and middle of list candidates. The female and male candidate variable, each consisting of 
three categories, was recoded in a variable with only two categories: head of list and middle of list 
candidate. The control category was again excluded. Here too, we calculated weighting factors for each 
group per policy issue to exclude possible effects from respondent’s gender (gender solidarity effects).  
The mean scores for the presented female and male head of list and middle of list candidates’ perceived 
issue competence are presented in Table 3. Significance scores are presented for the difference between 
female and male candidates. More detailed results can be found in the Appendix (see Tables 3, 4, 5 and 
6).   
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Table 3: Mean scores indicating the perceived issue competence of female and male head of list 
and middle of list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very 
competent) 
 Male head Female head Sig.  Diff. Male middle Female 
middle  
Sig. Diff. 
Defence 5,00 
(N=348) 
4,88 
(N=348) 
0,130 -0.12 4,80 
(N=355) 
4,80 
(N=351) 
0,981 = 
Finance 5,15 
(N=364) 
5,16 
(N=366) 
0,864 +0.01 5,03 
(N=333) 
4,96 
(N=340) 
0,405 -0.07 
Tourism 4,16 
(N=337) 
4,25 
(N=344) 
0,409 +0.09 4,22 
(N=356) 
4,16 
(N=358) 
0,525 -0.06 
Climate 4,77 
(N=350) 
4,89 
(N=360) 
0,177 +0.12 4,99 
(N=343) 
4,85 
(N=336) 
0,113 -0.14 
Education 5,05 
(N=323) 
5,13 
(N=340) 
0,339 +0.08 4,85 
(N=321) 
4,93 
(N=324) 
0,349 +0.08 
Health 
care 
4,99 
(N=367) 
5,01 
(N=353) 
0,765 +0.02 4,86 
(N=338) 
4,84 
(N=339) 
0,822 -0.02 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
The inclusion of the policy issues into our analysis does not seem to bring about noticeable changes. 
Female head of list candidates are perceived as being more competent than male head of list candidates 
for almost all policy issues, except for defense. This is not surprisingly, since previous research also 
pointed out that defense is the most typical masculine policy issue (Lawless, 2004). However, these 
differences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, female middle of list candidates are 
perceived as being less competent than male middle of list candidates, except for education, which is 
one of the most outspoken communal issues. Also these differences are not statistically significant. 
By making a comparison between the mean differences for female and male candidates, we can estimate 
whether the list position has a mediating effect on gendered perceptions of competence. When we look 
at Figure 1, an interesting pattern emerges, although it fails to reach statistical significance. When the 
candidate occupies a head of list position, the perceived issue competence is almost always higher for 
female candidates (orange bars) compared to male candidates (blue bars). But, when the candidate 
occupies a middle of list position, the perceived issue competence of male candidates (grey bars) is 
higher compared to female candidates (yellow bars). This seems to indicate a minor effect, in which 
female candidates are rewarded for a high list position, but punished for a middle of list position. 
However, there are no statistically significant differences in the mean scores for female and male head 
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of list candidates, nor for female and male middle of list candidates. These results again disprove our 
hypotheses. 
Figure 1: Mean scores indicating the perceived competence of the presented male and female head 
of list and middle of list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 
(very competent) 
 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Both gender and list position cues have an influence on voters’ perceptions of the competences of 
political candidates. However, previous research did not go into the interaction of these cues. 
Competence is a central criterion in vote decision-making processes. It is therefore important to uncover 
the mediating effects of list position on gendered perceptions of competence. We focused on the 
interaction of both cues in the Flemish (Belgian) context. This provides a good case study, because of 
the combination of flexible List-PR system and far-reaching quota regulations requiring that one of the 
two top places on the list should be reserved for a woman (Celis & Meier, 2006).  
Our results, based on an experimental study conducted among a representative sample of the general 
population, illustrate that list position does not mediate the effect of a candidate’s gender on his/her 
perceived level of competence. Both male and female candidates benefit from a high list position. The 
difference in mean score is somewhat more outspoken for female candidates, but, rather surprisingly, 
not statistically significant different from men’s. Consequently, the idea that strong competition leads 
to selection of the best and that voters will think that female head of list candidates will have outstanding 
qualifications was not confirmed.  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Defence Finance Tourism Climate Education Health care
Perceived issue competence
Male head Female head Male middle Female middle
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Our second hypothesis also had to be rejected. The perceived competence of female candidates with a 
middle of list position is not statistically significant different from that of male middle of list candidates. 
The argument, proposed by quota opponents, that the use of electoral gender quotas will bring about the 
perception that parties select less qualified candidates in order to meet the quota standards does not hold. 
Female middle of list candidates do not suffer from lower perceived competence.  
Overall, voters do not seem to differentiate between female and male candidates. This might be an 
indication that respondents are not inherently negatively biased towards female candidates and estimate 
the competence of male and female candidates more or less equally. This again highlights the importance 
of the political context in the development of gender-neutral attitudes. Apart from a high number of 
female MP’s, linked to the long existence of electoral gender quotas, women have recently been well 
represented in the Flemish government (with several female deputy prime-ministers) and in parties (with 
several female party leaders). Flemish voters have been intensively exposed to female politicians in high 
political positions, which seems to result in gender-neutral attitudes. These gender-neutral attitudes are 
not restricted to prominent or high-level female politicians, but apply to all female candidates. 
Consequently, the positive effects of a gender-neutral political context are beneficial for all female 
candidates, irrespective of their list position. 
Our findings have a number of implications. First, the present study demonstrates that female candidates 
do not seem to be disadvantaged at the polls. Competence is a central criterion in voters’ assessments of 
election candidates in List-PR systems (André, Pilet, & Wauters, 2010; Goeminne & Swyngedouw, 
2007). Since voters do not differentiate between female and male candidates in terms of competence, 
the risk for a voter bias is significantly reduced. However, it might be that other aspects of a voter bias 
negatively affect voters’ perceptions of female candidates. It would therefore be interesting to 
supplement this study with research about the determinants of vote choice. In that light, it is important 
to note that, although voters have various cues at their disposal, not all cues will actually be used. There 
might be variation in how strongly candidates are linked to certain cues, related to prior knowledge 
about the candidates (Conover & Feldman, 1989).  
Second, referring back to the title of this paper, societies are often influenced by an ideology of a 
woman’s place. This links to the idea that women are more likely to hold low status positions (Eagly & 
Steffen, 1984) and should play an apolitical role (Shvedova, 2005). This seems to less apparent in our 
Flemish case-study. Flemish voters have been intensively exposed to female politicians, holding diverse 
executive and legislative mandates. According to the theory of exposure (Jennings, 2006), this possibly 
results in a less biased evaluation of female candidates. It could therefore prove useful to replicate this 
study in other contexts and regions in order to further disentangle the interplay between gender cues and 
other contextual elements. It would be particularly useful to make a comparison with other List-PR 
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systems with quota regulations, such as Poland, Portugal and Spain, or most Latin-American countries, 
or with other List-PR systems without quota regulations, such as Israel and Sweden. 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the reliance on heuristic cues depends on the level of 
political interest (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007) and education (Falk & Kenski, 2006). It could thus be that 
our results only reveal a tip of the iceberg and that voters with little political interest are more likely to 
use gender as a heuristic cue and to differentiate between male and female candidates in terms of 
competence, but this remains for future research.   
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Appendix 
Presented candidate profiles 
 
  
19 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the experiment’s participants – weighted for age and gender (N=2129) 
Gender  
Male 50,2% 
Female 49,8% 
Age  
<37  28,3% 
37 – 56 37,0% 
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57+ 34,7% 
Level of education  
Primary education 4,5% 
Lower secondary education 20,0% 
Higher secondary education 40,8% 
Non-university higher education 21% 
University education 13,7% 
Average left right positioning (1=very leftist, 7=very rightist) 3,97 
Preferred party  
CD&V 12,9% 
Groen 16,6% 
N-VA 33,9% 
Open VLD 11,0% 
PVDA 6,4% 
Sp.a 9,6% 
Vlaams Belang 9,6% 
How often do they follow politics in the news?  
On a daily basis 53,5% 
2-3 times a week 23,6% 
Once a week 8,1% 
Less than once a week 10,6% 
Never 4,2% 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Variance for Perceived General Competence 
Candidate SS Df MS F Sig 
Between Groups 30.862 3 10.287 6.889 .000 
Within Groups 12380.352 8291 1.493   
Total 12411.214 8294    
 
Table 3: Mean scores indicating the perceived issue competence of female head of list and middle 
of list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very competent) 
 Head of list  Middle of list  Sig.  Difference 
Defence 4,88 (N=348) 4,80 (N=351) 0,343 +0.08 
Finance 5,16 (N=366) 4,96 (N=340) 0,015 +0.20 
Tourism 4,25 (N=344) 4,16 (N=358) 0,376 +0.09 
Climate 4,89 (N=360) 4,85 (N=336) 0,623 +0.04 
Education 5,13 (N=340) 4,93 (N=324) 0,028** +0.20 
Health care 5,01 (N=353) 4,84 (N=339) 0,050* +0.17 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
Table 4: Mean scores indicating the perceived issue competence of male head of list and middle of 
list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very competent) 
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 Head of list  Middle of list  Sig.  Difference 
Defence 5,00 (N=348) 4,80 (N=355) 0,019** +0.20 
Finance 5,15 (N=364) 5,03 (N=333) 0,154 +0.12 
Tourism 4,16 (N=337) 4,22 (N=356) 0,561 -0.08 
Climate 4,77 (N=350) 4,99 (N=343) 0,016** -0.22 
Education 5,05 (N=323) 4,85 (N=321) 0,022** +0.20 
Health care 4,99 (N=367) 4,86 (N=338) 0,142 +0.13 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
Table 5: Mean scores indicating the perceived issue competence of male head of list and female 
head of list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very 
competent) 
 Male head of list  Female head of list Sig.  Difference 
Defence 5,00 (N=348) 4,88 (N=348) 0,130 -0.12 
Finance 5,15 (N=364) 5,16 (N=366) 0,864 +0.01 
Tourism 4,16 (N=337) 4,25 (N=344) 0,409 +0.09 
Climate 4,77 (N=350) 4,89 (N=360) 0,177 +0.12 
Education 5,05 (N=323) 5,13 (N=340) 0,339 +0.08 
Health care 4,99 (N=367) 5,01 (N=353) 0,765 +0.02 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
Table 6: Mean scores indicating the perceived issue competence of male middle of list and female 
middle of list candidates for each policy issue on a scale from 1 (very incompetent) to 7 (very 
competent) 
 Male candidate  Female candidate Sig.  Difference 
Defence 4,80 (N=355) 4,80 (N=351) 0,981 = 
Finance 5,03 (N=333) 4,96 (N=340) 0,405 -0.07 
Tourism 4,22 (N=356) 4,16 (N=368) 0,525 -0.06 
Climate 4,99 (N=343) 4,85 (N=336) 0,113 -0.14 
Education 4,85 (N=321) 4,93 (N=324) 0,349 +0.08 
Health care 4,86 (N=338) 4,84 (N=339) 0,822 -0.02 
*p<0,1, ** p<0,05, ***p<0,01 (two-tailed) 
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